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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

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[REDACTED] OBI, [REDACTED] x 2339,
has been asked to give a speech to the Williamsburg Junior
High School, Arlington, Virginia.

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His audience will be the General Education Class.

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We provided [REDACTED] with a copy of [REDACTED]
unclassified speech, and the 'What's CIA' article from "U. S.
News & World Report."

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[REDACTED] will return documents and will tell us what
date the speech will be given.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]
Public Affairs Officer

CIA 1-
CIA 2-
CIA 1-0

THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

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By

For

The Institute on Communism and Constitutional Democracy

Westminster College

New Wilmington, Pennsylvania

14 July 1965

Draft

It is customary in situations of this kind, I believe, for the speaker to assure his audience that he is very happy to be with them and happy to have the opportunity of making some small contribution to their knowledge, understanding, or entertainment. I have always been a bit uneasy about this little piece of protocol. I expect that it is designed to establish an atmosphere of mutual happiness and thus create a rapport that will be conducive to communication. I have the uncomfortable feeling, however, that sometimes this assurance about the speaker's happiness serves only to establish the fact that at least someone is happy about the whole thing.

This evening I am going to talk briefly about the Central Intelligence Agency, why it exists, how it came into being, and what its function is in our national security structure. Beyond that I hope to give you some understanding of what we call "The Central Intelligence Concept." In attempting to do this I shall give a brief sketch of the historical background of intelligence, describe the development of the Central Intelligence concept, and outline our present structure for national security and the part that the Central Intelligence Agency plays in that structure.

I shall not go into detail about the ancient and medieval history of intelligence, fascinating though it may be. You all know, I am sure, that intelligence is an ancient profession, that it is often

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called the second oldest profession, ~~and that it shares with the oldest profession something more than just antiquity.~~ I am also sure that most of you have read one of the very earliest accounts of a sophisticated intelligence operation -- that reported in the Old Testament describing how Moses sent the spies into the land of Canaan. If you are not familiar with that particular story or that particular Book, I recommend them very highly for your summer reading.

Although I am going to resist the temptation to talk about the history of intelligence in detail, there is one bit of historical lore that I feel is worth recounting. Virtually all of the intelligence historians mention that era in history when intelligence reached its most sophisticated level. This was back in medieval times in China when that vast country was divided into provinces, and each province was ruled by a War Lord. It seems that these War Lords were constantly fighting with each other about pieces of real estate, or strings of ponies or concubines, and because they were almost constantly at war, each of them developed his own intelligence apparatus. The intelligence officers became so expert at their jobs that they changed the whole mode of life for the War Lords. It ultimately developed that when two of these War Lords were about to go to battle, each would assemble his troops in battle positions, and then the two War Lords would sit down together, probably on the floor of a goat skin tent, and each would call in his chief intelligence officer. After listening to the reports

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of the opposing intelligence officers, the two War Lords would determine which of them would win the battle if it were fought, and having determined this, there was no need to fight the battle. The one who would have won simply took the spoils, and the loser suffered defeat without loss of life or limb.

The significant factor here, of course, is that in this situation intelligence served not as an aid to war but as a deterrent, even a preventive, to war. ~~Those of us who are not in the intelligence business are constantly hoping that eventually we can develop the science of intelligence so that it will again function primarily as a deterrent to war. Actually, there are some signs that we may be approaching this degree of sophistication.~~

Having resisted the temptation to delve deeply into the ancient history of intelligence, I am also going to resist the temptation of going into detail about the history of intelligence in the United States. There is, of course, a considerable body of such history, and it, too, is most fascinating. As a matter of fact, this country's intelligence history began before there was a country. I am sure that some of you are familiar with the work of the Committees for Secret Correspondence which functioned in the colonies before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. These, actually, were intelligence organizations, and their work was very important in the life of what was then an emerging nation. It

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is interesting to note that a courier for one of these Committees for Secret Correspondence became very famous because someone wrote a poem about him. His name was Paul Revere. During the revolutionary war the colonial military organization developed very sophisticated kinds of intelligence activities -- virtually every kind of intelligence activity that is known today. We are still using some of these as case studies in intelligence training.

~~Perhaps it is appropriate here to add one of those unkind little foot notes of which modern historians appear to be so fond. The great intelligence hero of the Revolutionary War, of course, is Nathan Hale. Unhappily, Nathan Hale was a very very bad intelligence officer. He made the egregious blunder of trying to hide a piece of paper in the heel of his boot. This was his first mission, of course, and such a mistake probably should have been tolerated. British counter-intelligence, however, was not tolerant, and they found the piece of paper and -- quite properly -- hanged Mr. Hale. Now Mr. Hale was an English teacher and had a flare for what was then still the King's English, and he said that his only regret was that he had only one life to give for his country. So we can admire Mr. Hale's patriotism, which we do, and we can applaud his diction, but we must conclude that he was a lousy intelligence officer.~~

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The talent for Intelligence activities demonstrated by the colonial Americans apparently lay dormant over the next century. For when this nation became involved in the Civil War -- or the War Between the States, as some of you prefer to call it -- there was virtually no Intelligence capability among the military leaders of either side. The history of American Intelligence during the Civil War is one of improvisation, occasional success, and frequent failure. The major Intelligence asset available to the military leaders of the North was the Pinkerton Detective Agency, and the Southern generals got most of their Intelligence from a group of Washington society ladies whose sympathy for the Southern cause was matched only by their skill in extracting military information from officers of the Union army.

Even after the civil war we made very slow progress in the development of our military Intelligence capability. The realization of our lack of progress came to us painfully with the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Pearl Harbor, of course, is known as one of the greatest Intelligence failures in history. When we look at the origins and development of our regular military Intelligence organizations, we can understand our lack of an adequate Intelligence organization in December of 1941. The first military Intelligence unit to be organized was the Office of Naval Intelligence, which was created in 1882 as a part of the Bureau of Navigation. It was not an Intelligence organization as we know them today; rather it was a technical information gathering group

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concerned primarily with rivers and harbor information. The first military intelligence organization in the War Department was the Corps of Intelligence Police, which was organized in 1917. This later became the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Military Intelligence Division was created in the War Department in 1918, and this became the nucleus for what was later to be G-2. Indicative of the slowness of with which our military intelligence capability developed is the fact that in 1938, twenty years after the creation of the Military Intelligence Division, the entire G-2 organization in the War Department consisted of about twenty officers and forty-five civilians. This was one year before Hitler's armies marched into Poland and three years before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

One of the immediate aftermaths of Pearl Harbor was, as none of you is old enough to remember, a widespread attack on our military establishment for having failed to create an effective intelligence service. In the halls of Congress and the columns of the press our military leaders were accused of shortsightedness and dereliction in their duty. Actually, I don't think that the blame should have gone exclusively to the military. I believe that our peace-time military establishment rather reflected the attitude of the American people toward intelligence.

The American people had always felt that the practice of intelligence was an un-American activity. It was tolerated in time of war because it was necessary, but it was not to be tolerated in time of peace.

It was considered a dirty business that was completely inconsistent with the basic principles of democracy. I am sure that most of you have read about the action of Mr. Stimson when he became Secretary of State and discovered that in the State Department there was a small group of men who were engaged in breaking the communications codes of other countries. Mr. Stimson dissolved the group, eliminated the activity, and remarked that "gentlemen don't read other people's mail." This attitude was marked by high morality but extremely low practically in the face of an impending war. I think that it helps to explain what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Before Pearl Harbor, of course, there were men in the government who realized that our intelligence assets were not great enough to support us if we were to become involved in the war. President Roosevelt was one of these men, and Colonel William Donovan -- a ^{Army Reserve} professional ~~with America's three highest combat medals~~ military intelligence officer -- was another. In the spring of 1941 President Roosevelt sent Colonel Donovan to England to evaluate the capability of the British to withstand a German cross-channel invasion, which seemed imminent at that time. President Roosevelt realized that the United States would probably be drawn into the war sooner or later, and he had to know how much time we had to get prepared.

Colonel Donovan made his trip to England -- as a matter of fact, he made two trips -- and when he returned he reported to the President that the British would be successful in fighting off any invasion that the Germans might launch. In addition to this report, he made a recom-

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mandation to the President that the United States begin at once to develop an adequate intelligence capability. Colonel Donovan had seen the British intelligence apparatus at work and had developed a healthy respect for it. He had also gained some understanding of the efficiency of the German intelligence service. His recommendations were very specific, and the President accepted them in full. In July of 1941, then, the President created by presidential directive what was called the Office of the Coordinator of Information and placed Donovan at the head. Donovan was to report directly to the President. The mission of the Coordinator of Information was to develop first, a system of coordinating all intelligence activities in the military establishment; second, to develop a capability for research and analysis of intelligence information; third, to build an effective propaganda capability; and fourth, to develop a capability for carrying on unconventional warfare.

It is significant, I think, to note here that the requirement for Donovan to report directly to the President was the beginning of the Central Intelligence Concept. As we shall see, that concept -- that all intelligence activities should be coordinated by someone directly responsible to the President -- carried through to our present national security organization.

Donovan went to work immediately and during the eleven months that the Office of the Coordinator of Information existed he made remarkable progress toward fulfilling all of the responsibilities charged to him.

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In June of 1942, however, the United States was at war, and the President felt that the intelligence organization should be a military one. Therefore, the Office of the Coordinator of Information was abolished and the Office of Strategic Services was created. I shall not go into the history of OSS, for I am sure that all of you have read about the amazing achievements of that organization during the three years of its existence. I think, however, that it is important to point out that in addition to all of the fascinating achievements in unconventional warfare, OSS also made important progress in the science of intelligence research and evaluation.

When the war was over in October of 1945, OSS was disbanded. The unconventional warfare capability was turned over to the War Department and became a part of the G-2 organization. The research and analysis unit was turned over to the Department of State and continued to function there. The nation's leaders knew, however, that we were going from a hot war into a cold war, and that there would be a continuing need for a national intelligence organization. Therefore, in January of 1946 President Truman created, by executive order, what was called the National Intelligence Authority.

In this directive, President Truman instructed the Secretary of State (James F. Byrnes), the Secretary of War (Robert P. Patterson), the Secretary of the Navy (James V. Forrestal), and his own personal

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representative (Admiral William D. Leahy), to constitute themselves as the "National Intelligence Authority." The Authority was directed to plan, develop, and coordinate "all Federal foreign intelligence activities" in order to "assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." The members of the Authority assigned persons and funds from their departments to form the "Central Intelligence Group," which was the operating body for the National Intelligence Authority. The "Group" was headed by a "Director of Central Intelligence" appointed by the President.

The National Intelligence Authority and its operating component, the Central Intelligence Group, were in existence for twenty months in 1946 and 1947. Under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947 they were superseded by the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The responsibilities of the Agency derive from two Acts of Congress -- the National Security Act of 1947 that created the Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. The Agency's mission, as described by the 1947 legislation is "coordination of the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interests of national security..." That act also specifies the various duties to be performed by the Agency in carrying out this mission and states that all of these duties are to be performed under the direction of the National

Security Council. In addition to stating what the Agency shall do, the Act of 1947 states what the Agency shall not do. It shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement, or internal security functions, and it shall not interfere with the responsibilities of other government departments and agencies in the collection, evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of departmental intelligence.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 supplemented the National Security Act with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency as follows:

(1) exempted the Agency, in the interest of "the security of foreign intelligence activities of the United States," from such existing Federal laws as require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency";

(2) specified that the appropriations or other moneys made available to the Agency "may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds"; and that "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified";

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(3) permitted the Agency to negotiate purchases and contracts without advertising under certain conditions, such as for supplies or services the nature of which should not be publicly disclosed;

(4) permitted the Agency to transfer to and receive funds from other Government agencies, for activities authorized under the National Security Act, including the reimbursement to other agencies for personnel assigned or detailed to the Agency;

(5) permitted the Agency to contract for special research or instruction for Agency personnel at outside institutions;

(6) provided for special travel allowances and related expenses for Agency personnel assigned to duty outside the United States; and

(7) granted the Director of Central Intelligence authority to approve the entry into the United States of certain aliens and their families, up to one hundred persons annually, subject to the determination (by the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization) that such entry is "in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission."

Under these acts of Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence is the Government's principal intelligence officer. He serves as the Principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council on

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all matters of intelligence related to the national security. CIA's responsibilities are carried out subject to various directives and controls by the President and the National Security Council.

The major mechanism through which the Director of Central Intelligence meets his responsibility of coordinating all U.S. intelligence activities is the United States Intelligence Board.

The Director of Central Intelligence, as the President's representative, and as the Government's principal intelligence officer, is chairman of this Board. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a member, representing the CIA. The other members are the heads of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Department of Defense, and representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Acting in consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Board, the Director of Central Intelligence makes recommendations to the National Security Council concerning the intelligence structure of the Government as a whole, to insure that each element is functioning properly in the national intelligence effort.

Similarly, after coordination with that Board, the Director presents to the National Security Council "National Intelligence Estimates," prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency working with representatives of other governmental intelligence organizations and, at times, with cleared civilian experts. These estimates cover specific foreign situations of

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national security concern, or the world situation generally. They may embody a unanimous opinion, or may contain dissenting views by one or more of the participants.

The "dissenting view" provision in the submittal of National Intelligence Estimates to the National Security Council is, I think, worth noting. Because the Board is not required to submit a unanimous opinion, there is no "lowest-common-denominator" watering down of the estimate when it goes to the NSC. The opinion expressed is officially that of the Director of Central Intelligence, who has the responsibility for the estimate. Dissenting views are, however, made known to the NSC.

By means of these coordinated estimates, along with related types of intelligence reports and evaluations, the Central Intelligence Agency exercises its responsibility to insure that the information going to the President and his principal advisers on foreign policy and national defense -- the members of the National Security Council -- is timely, consistent, and complete. The CIA brings together the judgement of intelligence officers in all departments and agencies on the major issues of fact and interprets them for the benefit of the President and his advisers.

In addition to its coordination activities, the CIA provides various "services of common concern" to the U.S. intelligence organization generally. It conducts independent research in fields of economic and

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scientific intelligence; monitors foreign news and propaganda broadcasts; and collects intelligence abroad. It also provides specialized library and translation services, including both mechanized and manually operated data-processing facilities, to the various elements of the U.S. intelligence organization.

CIA's facilities and techniques for the indexing, abstracting, translation, storage, and retrieval of intelligence information have been praised as "the most comprehensive information system now in operation," by the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. Senate. Among the features of this system are specialized miniature photography, facsimile-printing devices, and punch card indexes extending to more than 40 million cards, used for retrieving documents automatically.

The Central Intelligence Agency does not duplicate and rival the existing intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other U.S. Government agencies. It makes maximum use of the resources of existing agencies. It helps put an end to unnecessary duplication.

Because of the nature of its duties, required by law and by considerations of national security, the Central Intelligence Agency does not confirm or deny published reports, whether true or false, favorable or unfavorable to the Agency or its personnel; never alibis; never explains its organization; never identifies its personnel, except for the few in the top echelons; and does not discuss its budget, its methods of operation, or its sources of information.

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The Central Intelligence Agency is directly accountable to Presidential authority and control. This accountability is exercised in a number of ways, notably through the National Security Council, which is privy to CIA's activities and programs generally; through the Bureau of the Budget, on fiscal matters; and by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was established by President Kennedy on 4 May 1961. It represents a reactivation, with broadened terms of reference, of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which had been established by President Eisenhower in 1956, in line with recommendations made in 1955 by the Hoover Commission. The Board of Consultants has been headed by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., by General John E. Hull, and by Mr. Clark M. Clifford.

The Board's functions, defined by Executive Order of 4 May 1961 are: "... The function of the Board shall be to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security. ... In the performance of its advisory duties, the Board shall conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of other executive departments and agencies having such or similar responsibilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields, and shall report thereon to the President each six months or more

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frequently as deemed appropriate. The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments and agencies concerned shall make available to the Board any information with respect to foreign intelligence matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President. The information so supplied to the Board shall be afforded requisite security protection as prescribed by the provisions of applicable laws and regulations."

On appropriations and related legislative matters, the Director of Central Intelligence has contact with several committees of the Congress, and particularly the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and their respective subcommittees dealing with CIA affairs.

This, then, is the Central Intelligence Agency. It is an integral part of our governmental structure, a necessary element in our National security, a governmental organization established by law with missions and duties and limitations prescribed by law, an agency accountable to both the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government.

On the 28th of April 1965 at the White House swearing-in ceremonies *The Former Director* *and the then Deputy*
for ~~the present~~ *Director (NOW Director)*, Mr. William F. Raborn, Jr., ~~and his Deputy~~
~~Director~~, Mr. Richard Helms, President Johnson pointed out that long

ago this nation learned that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. In a real sense it is the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency to safeguard our liberty through the exercise of eternal vigilance.